In a context of low levels of trust in leaders in the wider society, this article examines how far there has been ‘contamination’ from that environment within universities. It records examples of poor leadership against three issues: corruption, competence and inequality. The analysis draws on empirical studies from the UK in a period of crisis, fifty years of experience of leaders as a professional within higher education, running the national programme for potential top managers and other courses around the world, and a recent synthesis of reports from the UK Leadership Foundation for Higher Education. The lessons are transferable to other national, and international contexts.

**Keywords:** leadership, higher education, values, trust, university

‘Surrender yourself humbly, then you can be trusted to take care for all things’ – Lao Tsu, c600 BCE, *Tao Te Ching*, chapter 13

Trust: ‘the willingness of a person to be vulnerable to the actions of another…based on the expectation that the other will perform a particular action important to the trustor, irrespective of the ability to monitor and control that action’ (Mayer et al, 1995)

‘Trust cannot be ‘managed’; it has to be engendered by behaviour’ (Vice-chancellor, Project interviewee)

**Introduction: the wider context**

There has been a diminishing level of trust in leaders over the past two decades, evident in many countries. Jameson (2014) reported that in 2012, Kelly’s Global Workforce Index, based on 168,000 respondents in 30 countries, showed that only 38% were satisfied with their current management’s leadership style. They wanted democratic, empathetic, visionary modes, but got authoritarian styles. According to Kouzes and Posner (1987) trust is built on values-oriented leadership characterised by integrity, honesty, high standards of conduct and emotional intelligence. In the UK, the division between national leaders and led has been widened by three main issues: corruption (not integrity and honesty), competence (a lack of high performance standards) and socio-economic inequality (not emotional intelligence that puts the leader in the shoes of the led to develop understanding of their situation, and recognise and reward their contribution).
The corruption covers many groups of leaders, from the failure to control the behaviour of UN ‘peace-keeping’ troops downwards. In the UK, politicians, never high on the trust ranking, have been exposed as making fraudulent claims for exaggerated expenses on top of generous salaries, of apparently ‘selling’ peerages to fellow millionaires giving financial support to political parties and getting direct control of power in return, and, in the recent referendum on EU membership, promulgating blatant lies, which were acknowledged openly and without apparent remorse immediately after the poll result was announced, when they had served their purpose (Cooper, 2016). Even worse, they were accused by the United Nations of fostering a surge in xenophobic race-hate crimes. The police, who are charged with investigating crimes, have themselves been revealed as harbouring criminals – concealing evidence, operating with racist bias, shooting to kill without provocation and then attempting to pervert the course of justice when investigations were mounted. The priesthood, which is charged with promoting faith-based morality, have been shown to be immoral: protecting sexual predators, and putting defence of a church’s reputation/image/brand above support for the suffering little children. Neuberger (2005) records and laments the pervasive decline in moral standards in the 21st century, with selfish pursuit of success displacing support for the less advantaged. The press, a last resort in uncovering corruption, has been mired in illegalities and abuse of privacy in the interests of sales and a good story.

In business, corruption combines with injustice and inequality: chief executive salaries in the FTSE top hundred companies now average more than 150 times the median wage of employees (Oakley, 2015); dividends are maintained and paid from ‘profits’ while employee pension funds are emptied to fund them; wages of the low paid are held down to a level where the taxpayer has to provide benefits to compensate for employer greed, while bonuses are paid even when business performance has sagged, so that incompetence at the top is rewarded but those at the bottom are made redundant. Banks received over £100 billion when they caused the financial crisis in 2008, but continued to operate corruptly with very few top managers paying any penalty for significant criminality for which they carried ultimate responsibility, and very few prosecutions at any level. Even after 2008, they continued mis-selling products and fiddling exchange rates.

Governmental incompetence is shown in many examples of ‘blunders’ chronicled by King and Crewe (2014). Defence procurement has wasted billions of pounds on equipment that cannot be used; major ICT projects, for example on health records, have taken many years and much money before being abandoned. These overshadow those in education, from individual learning accounts (misspent) to the debacle of the e-University (where the leaders were surprised to discover that in Brazil, a major target market, people spoke Portuguese, not Spanish: culpable ignorance as well as incompetence). Elliot (2016) believes that leaving the EU may expose the short-termism of business in importing cheap labour and failing to invest
in modern equipment. That is not a new story: Hutton (1995) denounces a financial system that valued immediate profit over long-term commitment with companies having a ‘cult’ of priority for shareholders’ profits. He stands in a long line of commentators, led by Corelli Barnett (1986), who traced the persistent failure to invest in development of people and renewal of plant back to the warning by Prince Albert, at the 1851 Great Exhibition, that both were needed in the face of challenges from Germany and the USA.

So, it is not surprising that Page (2006) reported a rise in scepticism and in scrutiny of the credibility of ‘authorities’, including government, and other agencies of the ‘establishment’. There was a discourse of disconnection in several of the works cited and examined by Barham (2004) as an inter-generational shift, with mutual incomprehension. As King and Crewe (2014) comment on one initiative – to fine anti-social, drunken, noisy thugs, on the spot and accompany them to a cash machine to draw out the money to pay – ‘The prime minister [Tony Blair at the time] was clearly assuming that other people lived lives much like his own. His assumption was unfounded’ (p243). This disenchantment with those in power is expressed in the swing of voters to ‘populist’ movements, many of which have a discourse of derision for established leaders and the establishment enclaves from which they view the ‘real’ world. Prange-Gstoehl (2016) records a drop in trust in national governments across Europe from 41 per cent in 2007 to 23 per cent in 2013. There has been a shift in the discourse: previously, it was the dissenters who had been disconnected and pathologised; the debate and outcome of the EU referendum inverted that assertion: instead, the elitist leaders are seen as being in a disconnected ‘bubble’ floating around far above the real world: a cloud cuckoo land that is not a Greek comedy, but leads to tragedy for many of the ‘groundlings’.

The university connection

It then emerges that the clear majority of leaders and senior staff in those domains have degrees from just two ‘leading’ universities – Oxford and Cambridge – and most of the rest are graduates of other elitist institutions in the higher education (HE) sector. Harvard apologised for the failure of its MBA graduates; Manchester students demonstrated against the failure to review and reform economics teaching. Garcia, having studied MBA curricula with their poor treatment of ethical issues in his PhD (which I examined), explores the views of chief executives in France to suggest that there is a widespread awareness of the need for ethical leadership, but not a total commitment, which the leaders he interviewed blamed on the regimes in countries where they choose to do business (Garcia, 2011).

There is another link with universities, at least for the ‘four Ps’: autonomy (McNay and Hladchenko, 2015). Politicians, the police, the priesthood and the press all self-regulate; if there is a problem they self-investigate, and, often, self-exculpate. This is a feature of many professional bodies in the exercise of their role as a
professional collective, a community of practice, with a duty of protecting and enhancing standards and ensuring probity in pursuit of the profession (Downie, 1990). Regrettably, the response from the leaders of the professional groups, including universities, has been denial, defensive riposte and doing very little except punishing those who exposed the wrong-doing. So, the number of ‘offenders’ may not be high, but the whole collective is embroiled in appearing to condone more than condemn. This abuse of autonomy was a major element underlying the attack on professionals by Margaret Thatcher in the 1980s and her attempts to introduce accountability through regulatory bodies, structurally separate from those whom they regulated, since the ‘checks and balances’ within internal governance were judged not to be working. This culminated in 1995 in a Committee on Standards in Public Life, which established seven principles for conduct in public life and decision making by leaders – see the Appendix - and still gives guidance to providers of public services (CSPL, 2015); but it has no ‘teeth’ to exercise any sanctions. O’Neill (2002) argued that ‘we need more intelligent forms of accountability…to focus less on grandiose ideals of transparency and rather more on limiting deception…I think we may undermine professional performance and standards in public life by excessive regulation, and that we may condone and even encourage deception in our zeal for transparency’. Yet transparency does reveal deceptions, as I will show: data on higher education operations are now very open to scrutiny, not least by researchers.

Universities are subject to diverse forms of accountability and ‘excessive regulation’. Yet I have a concern that the moral declines among the leaders and the powerful in UK society may be filtering in to universities, across the boundaries their leaders should be monitoring (McNay, 2012). The increase in the culture of suspicion identified by O’Neill is not effectively addressed by the blunt instruments of quantitative audit, especially when the metrics used may be only proxies for the target involved, as the UK government acknowledges over its Teaching Excellence Framework, so the statistics become ‘damned lies’. Trow (1996) elaborates the pithy comment that ‘you can’t fatten a pig by weighing it’: ‘accountability and cynicism about human behaviour go hand in hand. But trust has much to recommend it in the relation of institutions to their supporting societies, and not least for colleges and universities, even though it is sometimes violated and exploited’.

This article reviews pressures on the values of universities, and the factors behind a loss of trust in their leadership. There are some parallels that I try to identify without claiming in any way that there is an extreme problem, sufficient to induce a ‘moral panic’ (Garland, 2008). Academics are among the most trusted groups in society, and may set high standards for their leaders (Ipsos Mori, 2016).

It draws on several joint projects; mainly two: one with nearly 300 responses to an online survey on Higher Education and Human Good (Bone and McNay, 2006, McNay, 2008), another on Values and Leadership at a time of crisis commissioned by the Leadership Foundation for Higher Education (see Jameson, 2012), when I
conducted interviews with eighteen heads of institutions, other senior staff and experienced researchers in the topic. As I finalised it, the Leadership Foundation published a survey on leadership and management with nearly 1,000 responses from staff in its network – universities and HE agencies – and university governors (LFHE, 2016), which I also draw upon.

**System changes and pressures**

One of the main challenges for leaders in HE, and the public sector more widely, is the constant change in policy and management at system level. The claim above that checks and balances were not working would be disputed by many within institutions. Yet, in 1988 the polytechnics were nationalised and local authorities, carrying a democratic mandate and providing a check on, and balance to, national government as well as institutional leaders, were excluded from any role in their continuing development, having led in establishing and nurturing them. A system of corporate governance was imposed, by law, which reduced the role of the academic community and required the senate equivalents – academic boards - to have a majority of managers in their membership and be only advisory to the chief executive, thus diminishing the collective role of disenfranchised professorial leaders (Rowlands, 2017, in press). There is evidence that that last group then became disconnected: in my university, it is difficult to get any professors to stand for election to the academic board. In the most recent election, initially, there were no nominations; in another, a couple of years previously, with two candidates to choose between, only three votes were cast (I cast one of them; I assume the candidates cast the other two). The 1988 legal ruling did not apply to universities established by charter, but other changes were imposed and, at the same time, a government commitment to a market-led philosophy meant that competition was seen, wrongly, as the main motivator of quality, undermining the collegiality inside universities and the collective collaboration among them. Thus, an ‘us and them’ mentality developed, with mutual suspicion displacing trust.

This had two consequences relevant to this article. Staff blamed their local university leaders for not resisting these changes. Indeed, my interviews drew comments from some of those leaders criticising their peers for cowardice in not being openly critical about policy, but, as one said, it is ‘impolitic to make resistance to the government agenda obvious and to take on centres of power and patronage’. Another saw government as driving wedges to promote division among HE institutions: they became fragmented into stratified ‘mission groups’ and lost collective solidarity. So, there is a lack of trust at system level, both vertically and laterally.

That led to divergence between staff’s preferred aims for HE and their perception of prevailing system objectives (McNay, 2008). Academic staff preferences can be clustered in five summary headings:
- Personal/moral/aesthetic development
- Pursuit of knowledge in a discipline
- Development of the general powers of the mind
- Contribution to society – emancipatory/social equity/meritocratic
- Employment/skills/economic benefit

Prevailing system objectives were seen as
- Instrumental – skills supply for the competitive economy
- Financial – income generation and efficiency; more for less
- Expansion – ‘bums on seats’, not wider access.

The gap between those oppositional stances has widened since then because of:
- Further moves to a marketised system, with high fees and low government support for institutions’ teaching role,
  - research objectives strongly linked to economic productivity, and restricted concepts of excellence (McNay, 2016)
  - greater surveillance, despite a pledge to ‘roll back the frontiers of the state’, and
  - evaluation processes, linked to funding, that lack acceptance by staff with expertise in such matters.

**Internal cultures and values**

That divergence of views seeped through to the internal fabric of governance and cultural norms. In 1997, the last serious major review of HE in the UK nailed its theses to the ministry door on values:

There are values shared throughout higher education and without which higher education, as we understand it, could not exist [my emphasis]. Such values include:

- commitment to the pursuit of truth
- a responsibility to share knowledge
- freedom of thought and expression
- analysing evidence rigorously and using reasoned argument to reach a conclusion
- a willingness to listen to alternative views and judge them on their merits
- taking account of how one’s own arguments will be perceived by others
- a commitment to consider the ethical implications of different findings or practices

(Dearing, 1997, paragraph 5.39)

Yet, only five years later, Duke (2002) saw
Neurotic managers actively promote a loss of institutional memory and low-trust methods of working as mechanisms of control, with the result that staff dedication and creativity are driven into opposition and resistance.

This might be thought to be unrepresentative, but a further five years later a single issue of the ‘trade paper’ – the *Times Higher Education Supplement* – recorded five examples of those values being flouted (McNay, 2008). I accept that reporters have values exaggerating what may be exceptions, but in the past ten years, when external turbulence needed a response of internal trust to promote stability and security in professionals to continue to experiment developmentally – essential to a successful university according to Shattock (2003) - there has been a constant stream of similar occurrences. Indeed, leaders have added to turbulence: one of the first things many do on appointment, is to re-structure (Hogan, 2012). I know of no rigorous evidence, or even examples, where restructuring has led to improvement of quality, or commitment. While it is a visible announcement of a new leadership regime, it diverts effort from developing people and improving processes. It is disruptive, and often cyclic – I now work in a faculty, though that structure was abolished in 2001, with significant redundancies, only to be re-instated by a newly arrived vice-chancellor. The trend is to bigger second tier units with an executive head, not to lead, but in my local case ‘to drive change [from the centre] through the university’. Deem et al (2007) label such post-holders ‘manager academics’ and Shattock (2013) sees them as ‘further reducing the participation of the academic community in matters of academic management closely related to their fields of activity’ (p226).

One response by leaders to disconnected discontent has been to demand loyalty. My own institution now lists that as one of the characteristics of a professional, and current proposals to government on research assessment (Stern, 2016) include reducing professorial freedom to choose what to research, and judging quality, in part, on how far it aligns with institutional strategy defined by senior management, further strengthening the corporate culture. Such controls are already visible in submissions to the Research Excellence Framework (McNay, 2016) where promoting the product, based on market values, led to some dubious claims, particularly over the impact of research (Oancea, 2016). All the case studies supporting claims are available on the REF website, so the claims are transparent. Many researchers and commentators have recorded the deceptions practised in ‘gaming’ such evaluation exercises for optimal advantage, with, again, loss of trust between the researchers and their organisation’s leaders. Yet trust is essential to a feeling of well-being, which enhances loyalty, improves performance and productivity and so enhances resilience in times of crisis (Helliwell et al, 2016).

Clark (1983) sees four values underpinning higher education: justice, competence, liberty and loyalty, but acknowledges that ‘when regimes are preoccupied with loyalty of faculty and students, little heed is given to equal
treatment or competent training or freedom of choice’ (p254). If loyalty is an element within a strongly corporate culture, that aligns with one of four used by Handy (1983) – crisis. He suggests that this is a temporary state, not durable. Yet constant crisis has become normal.

My interviews with leaders were set in a context of a claimed ‘crisis’ in 2010. As with the EU debate in 2016, the discourse was based on promoting fear, and therefore the need for loyalty and solidarity following alleged financial austerity and trebling of fee levels to the highest in Europe alongside a reduction in the 18-year-old cohort from which undergraduates are dominantly recruited, and changes in school exams to reduce the proportion of the smaller cohort who got higher grades. Yet leaders did not trust their staff, or have confidence that they would be loyal and committed followers. Where there is such lack of confidence, there is reversion to control mode: there was a centralising shift, so that budgets for marketing increased steeply to promote brand loyalty among applicants and the concept of student engagement developed as a form of internal relationship marketing to promote their loyalty once in the institution. One of my interviewees acknowledged that mistrust in management is a function of the majority of income being spent on central activities. One visible form of evidence of where student fee income goes is in buildings, much as successive empires have erected iconic buildings as statues to their greatness. However, what students want the money to be spent on is fuller support by, and easier access to, academic staff, which means extra appointments. Yet this is discouraged by guidance from national funding agencies about ‘norms’ for the proportion of budgets to go to staff headings. Centralisation has negative effects: it is promoted as support but operates as control. Two of the interviewees noted that entrepreneurial activities were best led locally, close to contacts with clients, but the central units for research and enterprise adopted bureaucratic procedures for project approvals that stemmed from a lack of trust and led to incompetent project management.

I can offer many examples from my professional history: in one case, student induction moved from being mainly programme and departmentally based to being run in a subordinate partnership with the corporate and bureaucratic centre. Yet van der Velden (2012) has shown that such student support activities are better done at devolved level, in McNay’s (2006) collegial enterprise culture.

Previously, my opposition, as a head of school, to centralisation of the admissions progress was overruled with consequences I predicted – neglect of our graduate teacher training programme in favour of undergraduate entries; forms ‘lost’ in office drawers, and severe under-recruitment leading to a drop in fee related income of over £600,000. Yet the leader who had imposed this did not apologise, there was no review of the decision and its operation, and no compensation from the centre for lost income – the price of the leadership decision was paid by the victims.
A third, final example, from a different employer: one executive team was intending to restructure the university to improve the quality of the student experience, a laudable objective, but marred by ignorance of research on the topic and no intention even to read any reports to draw on. At their request I provided a synthesis of expert evidence, which was ignored; the result was increased student dissatisfaction with loss of numbers as some students opted out.

My experience is not unique. Shattock (2013) notes that the new structures identified by Hogan were to allow devolution, but that ‘the prospect of retrenchment encourages the withdrawal of critical resource decisions back to the centre…centralisation of student recruitment and selection …[has] served to neutralise the new local centres of decision-making that the revised structures were designed to create’ (p227).

The academic heartland and the developmental periphery (Clark, 1998) are consequently disempowered. Yet small units are more nimble and responsive to change, and in touch with their specific market segment, where staff have a greater sense of identity, of belonging and therefore of loyalty – hard to achieve within a big conglomerate where there is a risk that people become anonymous and lose any affinity with the organisation. A leader must recognise that managing expertise and diversity means that power cannot be concentrated in an individual or even a small group of advisors, what one interviewee labelled ‘selected sycophants’. Another noted that the size of many universities is now such that delegation is essential to overcome the distance between the top leaders and the led. Leadership at middle levels is essential. Distance can lead to bad decisions because of a lack of local knowledge; overload reduces the personal contact needed to humanise leadership; communication becomes formal and impersonal; bureaucracy takes over and control is a fall-back position because engagement in development takes more time and expertise than saying ‘no’ or imposing impossible conditions – an experience of respondents to my major survey (Bone and McNay, 2006).

With the academic community disenfranchised, the central executive leadership has few other checks and balances. Most of the project interviewees were dismissive of governing bodies, and a survey by PA Consulting (PACG, 2010) found that 50 per cent of responding vice-chancellors thought their governing body was neither effective nor supportive. Yet, as trustees, governors carry final responsibility under charity law. Views that emerge from research are similar to those on non-executive trustees in business who also fail to hold their executives in check:

- lack of knowledge of higher education, not helped by academic representatives being excluded from much business – lack of trust again, and inequality of rights as members, already conditioned by their day-to-day role as subordinates of the executive, with no confidence about respect for role boundaries. Trade Union representatives are often first in line when redundancies are deemed necessary. Much
of governors’ information comes from the staff they are supposed to regulate, and so may be biased or incomplete; on one occasion I had to warn a chair of governors that the finance data presented to justify a major project had major flaws, known to me from different sources, but not revealed to key decision-makers;

- values at odds with those quoted above from the Dearing Report; different attitudes to remuneration, where senior staff have had salary increases, some excessive, while other staff have had a decline in income in real terms – more inequality, which leads to discontent and low productivity as shown by a major study on socio-economic disparities (Helliwell et al, 2016). The LFHE (2016) reported differences in values and perceptions between leaders and led: among governors responding to its survey, ‘there was little mention of ethics…sustainable development, corporate social responsibility…partnerships…equality and diversity’ (p14). Staff in the same survey wanted leaders with the right characteristics, including competence, morality and a commitment to consideration of staff, collaboration and equality rather than a top down approach (p3, 21). They also wanted someone with a passion for higher education, a deep understanding of the sector and academic credibility (p3, 32)

- different approaches to staff relations and management, closer to McGregor’s (1966) Theory X, where staff have to be controlled and driven, with imputed extrinsic motivation – mainly money - than Theory Y where they have more autonomy and perform better, motivated intrinsically by self-evaluation and self-direction. The different views are exemplified by shepherding. In the UK, sheep are controlled from behind with two dogs being used as ‘guards’; elsewhere they are led from the front and follow as in the biblical analogy. But, New Public Management is currently in the ascendant, so not much may change quickly.

**Parallels**

The higher Education Law in New Zealand gives universities the role of being ‘the critics and conscience of society’: a noble enterprise but one which requires the conscience to have high moral underpinning and the criticism to come from those beyond reproach. Let me repeat that the osmosis is in its early stages and the seeping contamination is not yet critical. But there is cause for concern:

- Williams (2016) and five witnesses outlined concerns over academic integrity. Many research results cannot be replicated; false positives are used; negative results from commercially funded projects are not reported; plagiarism results from pressure on time needed to go back to original sources. Articles are now withdrawn because of defects identified after publication. It reaches to the top – several European rectors having dubious doctoral theses have been identified, and have resigned. It needs to be tackled from the top, since management expectations create the pressures that lead to corners being cut. As Jameson (2012) has advocated, there is a need for ‘moral re-armament’.
The equivalent of rewarding donations may be honorary degrees, which are harmless baubles for individuals of varying worthiness and give the university short-term publicity, but the award of a PhD to a son of the Gadaffi family after a large donation from the Libyan leader led to questions being raised about possible impropriety in the balance between earning and paying, and to the resignation of the chief executive.

Other resignations have followed misuse of public money for personal and family purposes; other allegations reported include concealing, like the church, sexual harassment by academic staff after an internal enquiry (Weale and Batty, 2016), and bullying linked to suicide. There was a spate of CEO resignations in the first decade of the century. Confidentiality agreements mean that little is known of causes, though not all may have followed from values based disagreements with governors. In the USA, resignations- for good cause/bad behaviour - continue, reported by the Chronicle of Higher Education. Note that they were resignations or early retirements, not dismissals, where the formal process would be more open to scrutiny and would link the punishment to the crime.

CEO salaries have shot ahead of those of their staff (Grove, 2016). The average salary of a vice-chancellor is now over £250,000 - twice that of the prime minister. In 2014-5 top management pay went up by over 6 per cent to nearly six times that of mainstream lecturers -£43,327 p.a. – who had an increase on the year of just 1.2 per cent. The average pay of professional and other support staff is much lower.

Those inequalities apply even more to women and to minority ethnic groups, when it comes to pay and promotion. Leaders lament this but provide excuses for inaction. Significant evidence is emerging of racial bias in student recruitment to prestige universities. Black students also achieve lower classes of degrees than white students with similar entry qualifications, so the inequalities continue after entry.

Structures of accountability serve to expose some cases of incompetence, or worse. The Office of the Independent Adjudicator for Higher Education (www.oiahe.org.uk) records the ‘blunders’ made by universities in treatment of students, and their lack of openness in the conduct of responding to complaints. The Competition and Markets Authority (www.gov.uk/competition-and-markets-authority) has identified a number of universities ‘mis-selling’ their products/programmes by the information provided to applicants in prospectuses and web pages.

Envoy

The importance of the leader in setting the organisation culture/climate can be illustrated by my experience in two very different universities, where the cases – from lived reality - cannot have the anonymity normal to the ethics of research. The
The founding vice-chancellor of the UK Open University was convivial, congenial and collegial. Yet he led a team of entrepreneurial curriculum innovators – some deemed difficult mavericks in their previous institutions – to establish a world-class reputation for teaching excellence in a very short time. His successor, an engineer, which may be relevant, promoted a more orderly, regulated operation, necessary to allay fears by a new right-wing government. The third holder of the office was a transformative entrepreneur, who never managed to command the trust given to his predecessors, perhaps because his style was ‘sell’ and people are suspicious of salesmen who don’t listen. At Greenwich, I arrived to a top team divided within itself and a leader who was very ill and could not control his team: one a bully and the other lacking competence in key areas. The vice-chancellor did visit staff meetings in departments, but the instruction was ‘give me only good news’. His successor was similar to the third example above – transformative from the top, but again, not listening to his followers, who never trusted his commitment to ‘their’ institution: the impression given, and people’s expectation was that he was just ‘passing through’, which he did. The third, was the former minister for higher education who had led on the introduction of fees and abolition of grants in parliament, so had a perception to overcome from the start. Again, there was a gap between the leader and the led; the one hardly visible to the others, with a reluctance – as with the first – to hear unpleasant truths.

Perhaps I am being too pessimistic; perhaps I should have more hope.

Perhaps public and political leaders will now, after the loud roar in the Brexit vote, start listening to the led. Perhaps the 45 per cent of vice-chancellors who acknowledged to PA Consulting (2011) that they did not think they had effective leadership capabilities will seek out learning opportunities, to help avoid the drift to control mode as a default setting when there is lack of confidence ion one’s own competence. Of course, over-confidence when incompetent is just as bad!

Perhaps the crisis will pass. It did so after 2008-10, with student numbers up, income per head from fees at a higher rate than the previous government allocation, bigger budgetary surpluses, and inflated scores for excellence in the Research Excellence Framework. Forecasting crisis can promote fear among followers, often falsely. A big majority of PACG respondents had anticipated ‘major structural disruptions in the HE sector over the next three years, but very few anticipate these affecting their own institutions’ (PACG, 2011:3). Was that arrogance or confidence, contrasting with their low view of their own competence levels and capabilities as reported to the survey? Did the followers, the professionals operating in the real world, not the paperwork university, manage the crisis pressures locally?

There are new challenges for higher education: from Brexit; from the demographic trends; from the rise in league tables of other countries’ institutions; from continuing reduction in government investment and incompetent policy
decisions. I can report positives from my own institution, where I now have the best leadership I have experienced in the four regimes I have worked through: there is now frequent recognition, praise and celebration of achievement, which develop trust capital. The difference among staff is tangible. Leadership is more open and communicative about the policy environment and strategic decisions, though collective decision-making is slow to emerge. My local leader is accessible, at times sharing the hot desk facility with me when she has to work on a different campus from her office; and she asks advice, respecting my expertise in relevant policy areas, which engenders reciprocal respect. My vice-chancellor allows me considerable academic freedom even when afflicting the comfortable, but stopping short of the offensive that Edward Said claimed was an academic right.

St Paul links hope to faith and charity (I Corinthians, 13:13). I have a problem with faith, described in another epistle (Hebrews, 11:1) as ‘the assurance of things hoped for, the conviction of things not seen’. As a professor, I spend a lot of time getting rigorous evidence, not just having faith or taking things on trust; so leaders have to offer evidence of being trustworthy, of deserving trust, and continuing to earn it – it is lost more easily that gained. Perhaps I should stick to being charitable…within limits!

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Appendix

**THE SEVEN PRINCIPLES OF PUBLIC LIFE**

**SELFLESSNESS**

Holders of public office should act solely in terms of the public interest. They should not do so in order to gain financial or other material benefits for themselves, their family, or their friends.

**INTEGRITY**
Holders of public office should not place themselves under any financial or other obligation to outside individuals or organisations that might seek to influence them in the performance of their official duties.

**OBJECTIVITY**

In carrying out public business, including making public appointments, awarding contracts, or recommending individuals for rewards and benefits, holders of public office should make choices on merit.

**ACCOUNTABILITY**

Holders of public office are accountable for their decisions and actions to the public and must submit themselves to whatever scrutiny is appropriate to their office.

**OPENNESS**

Holders of public office should be as open as possible about all the decisions and actions that they take. They should give reasons for their decisions and restrict information only when the wider public interest clearly demands.

**HONESTY**

Holders of public office have a duty to declare any private interests relating to their public duties and to take steps to resolve any conflicts arising in a way that protects the public interest.

**LEADERSHIP**

Holders of public office should promote and support these principles by leadership and example.

*These principles apply to all aspects of public life. The Committee has set them out here for the benefit of all who serve the public in any way.*

Макней Ян

**ЛІДЕРСТВО, ЦІННОСТІ, ДОВІРА І УНІВЕРСИТЕТИ**

Анотація

У контексті низького рівня довіри до лідерів в суспільстві в цілому, в даній статті розглядається те, як далеко таке «забруднення» середовища проникло в університети. Наводяться приклади неналежного керівництва в контексті трьох чинників: корупція, компетентність, нерівність. Аналіз грунтується на емпіричних дослідженнях, проведених у Великобританії в період кризи, п’ятдесятирічному досвіді професійної діяльності як керівника в галузі вищої освіти; проведення національної програми для потенційних топ-менеджерів та низки інших курсів у різних країнах світу, а також аналізі
звітів Фундації Лідерства Великобританії у вищій освіті. Висновки можуть екстраполюватися на інші національні та міжнародні контексти.

Ключові слова: лідерство, вища освіта, цінності, довіра, університети.

Макней Ян

ЛІДЕРСТВО, ЦЕННОСТИ, ДОВЕРИЕ И УНИВЕРСИТЕТЫ

Аннотация

В контексте низкого уровня доверия к лидерам в обществе в целом, в данной статье рассматривается то, как далеко такое «загрязнение» среды проникло в университеты. Приводятся примеры ненадлежащего руководства в контексте трех факторов: коррупция, компетентность, неравенство. Анализ основывается на эмпирических исследованиях, проведенных в Великобритании в период кризиса, пятидесятилетием опыте профессиональной деятельности как руководителя в области высшего образования; проведении национальной программы для потенциальных топ-менеджеров и ряда других курсов в разных странах мира, а также анализе отчетов Фонда лидерства Великобритании в высшем образовании. Выводы могут экстраполироваться на другие национальные и международные контексты.

Ключевые слова: лидерство, высшее образование, ценности, доверие, университеты.